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BOOK NOTES

The Law of Peoples
John Rawls
Harvard 1999
John Rawls, the great political philosopher, has turned his reflections to
questions of international justice, much as his philosophical ancestor Kant did toward
the end of his career. Indeed, Kant's conception of a "pacific federation" of states in
PerpetualPeace is Rawls's acknowledged model for the "realistic utopia" sketched in The
Law ofPeoples, which expands upon his 1993 essay by the same title (without, however,
revising its basic argument). Despite differing philosophical constraints and
geopolitical conditions, both Kant and Rawls aim to develop an ideal normative
framework for international law that accommodates a measure of realism and rejects
the idea of a world-state. Unfortunately, in its uncritical acceptance of so-called
"decent hierarchical societies" even at the level of ideal theory, the normative claim of
Rawls's Law of Peoples is undermined. This philosophical appeasement, meant to
secure perpetual peace in our time through a moderately demanding Law of Peoples
that liberal and "decent" hierarchical societies alike can endorse, departs fundamentally
from Kant's cosmopolitanism. For Kant, the "First Definitive Article of a Perpetual
Peace"-as opposed to a temporary interruption of hostilities-is that each member
state of thefoedus pacificum must have a republican form of government, which is partly
founded upon "the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens)." By contrast,
Rawls weakens his ideal of international justice to buy the assent of hierarchical
societies, which by definition lack equality among citizens, at the price of sacrificing a
theoretical basis for justifying reforms of the practices and institutions of these
hierarchical societies above a minimal level of decency.
Rawls's complex argument begins by extending the original position, in which
principles of justice, for the basic structure of society are chosen under epistemic
constraints that ensure fairness, from a single liberal society to what he calls the
Society of Liberal Peoples. In a second step, though still within ideal theory, he argues
that the substantive principles comprising the Law of Peoples are also acceptable to

Cbicaqojournafof7nternationaf aw

decent hierarchical societies, which possess decent consultation hierarchies and
common good conceptions ofjustice. Despite being inegalitarian, decent hierarchical
societies do respect basic human rights, allow some dissent, and at least consult with
representatives of groups whose members are denied full citizenship rights. Rawls
distinguishes decent hierarchical societies from truly paternalistic regimes such as
benevolent absolutisms, which respect basic human rights but allow no political
participation at all (and so are not well-ordered)-thus decent hierarchical societies lie
between liberal societies and benevolent absolutisms in terms of citizenship rights.
Non-ideal theory, finally, deals with types of societies that violate basic human
rights-outlaw societies against which humanitarian intervention may be justified,
and burdened societies to which a limited duty of assistance is owed. In short, in order
to broker the widest possible agreement for the Law of Peoples, Rawls draws the
limits of international toleration very broadly, excluding only outlaw societies, while
excusing burdened societies which cannot afford to conform to the Law of Peoples.
Rawls opposes cosmopolitanism not only by tolerating oppression within
hierarchical societies, but also by rejecting a global application of his difference
principle of distributive justice, which permits only those inequalities benefitting the
worst off in a society. The duty to assist burdened societies does not, in his view,
require redistribution of resources through international taxation, even though the
natural lottery clearly operates world-wide. Rawls's anti-cosmopolitanism, in both
manifestations, stems from his view that societies, not individuals, are the proper
subjects of global justice. His focus on "peoples" thus masks a residual, attenuated
statism, and it ignores the reality of multicultural and polyethnic societies. It also
conveniently leaves intact his account of justice at the intrasocietal level. Rightly
concerned to avoid charges of ethnocentrism, Rawls tolerates illiberal peoples and
provides no basis for critique to oppressed individuals within.these illiberal-in other
words hierarchical-societies. His central objection to liberal cosmopolitanism is that
it incorrectly assumes that only liberal societies can be acceptable. However, only in
liberal societies can what individuals consent to be reliably ascertained. A Kantian
theory of international justice must be more cosmopolitan and should not, in the
name of realism, countenance the oppression of individuals within so-called "decent"
hierarchical societies or the vast inequalities of resources among societies.
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